Elaborating the Constitutional Duty of Fiscal Care

A constitutional case for independent fiscal institutions as democratic safeguards for future generations.

Independent fiscal institutions (IFIs) have become an increasingly important feature of the fiscal landscape. They are often criticised as anti-democratic technocratic constraints on elected governments yet are also frequent targets of democratic backsliding. This paper re-conceptualises IFIs in constitutional terms. It isolates what we call the 'constitutional duty of fiscal care' - a collective responsibility to account for the fiscal interests of future generations - and argues that IFIs are best understood as ancillary agents that assist the public in fulfilling this duty. Examining institutional design and practice, particularly the turbulent recent history of the UK Office for Budget Responsibility, the paper shows how IFIs augment, rather than displace, democratic fiscal politics.

Bio:

Thomas Poole is a professor of Law at the London School of Economics and General Editor of the Modern Law Review. He writes on a range of topics in public law and political theory.